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Abstract
In this era of social media, popular narratives have increasingly important implications on
domestic policy and bilateral relations. In part based on the video of making Kimchi published by
a famous Chinese YouTuber, this study analyzes Chinese and Korean netizens’ opinions of each
other by examining around one thousand social media posts, which offer a glimpse of the unique
cultural confrontation between China and South Korea. By revealing the complexity of ChinaKorea relations through a social media lens, my analysis provides new insights into the
implications of these popular narratives on China’s policymaking. Even as an authoritarian regime,
the Chinese government has started to pay attention to and respond to netizens’ public opinions. It
is still difficult to assess how the generally negative view of Chinese and Koreans towards one
another will shape the future and if those with more positive views will increase in number. In any
case, the intense, combative dialogue on social media serves as an important reference point and a
cautionary warning—that the Chinese and Korean governments need to make policies that are
conducive to sustainable bilateral relations and the Asia Pacific stability.

Keywords: social media, popular narratives, cultural confrontation, China-Korea relations

3

Introduction
In the past ten years, the cultural disputes and cultural confrontations between China and
Korea are increasing significantly: South Korea appropriated and used the Dragon Boat Festival,
a traditional Chinese festival, as a means of World Intangible Cultural Heritage1 for their own
country; Li Ziqi, an influential YouTuber with 14.6 million subscribers published a video at the
end of 2020 about how to make Kimchi, which led to the intense online debate about which
country Kimchi originates from; the famous Chinese cartoonist “Old Xian” (Old 先)was accused
by Korean netizens of stealing the design of Korean consumes on his cartoon works published on
Twitter on Nov. 1st, 2020; a Chinese screenwriter fought with Korean netizens when they accused
him of appropriating Korean traditional consumes in his upcoming television series. Among those
confrontations, the “Kimchi war” aroused intense online discussion domestically and abroad. The
narratives from Chinese and Korean netizens are in direct conflict with the friendly, welcoming
official narratives of the Chinese and Korean governments. In a world connected by social
networks, the question of whether or not such large-scale online contention will damage ChinaKorea relations is one arousing many people’s curiosity, including mine.
China and Korea have a longstanding strategic and economic partnership, deep-rooted
cultural similarities, and a close emotional bond, which traditionally has made China-Korea

1 “The ‘intangible cultural heritage’ means the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills—
as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith—that communities, groups and,
in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage. This intangible cultural heritage, transmitted
from generation to generation, is constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to their environment,
their interaction with nature and their history, and provides them with a sense of identity and continuity, thus
promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity.” – UNESCO, “What is the intangible cultural heritage?”,
last accessed on Apr.28, 2021, https://ich.unesco.org/en/what-is-intangible-heritage-00003.
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relations solid as a rock. In the past, Korea was protected by China from aggression by other ethnic
groups. Trade and people’s exchange brought the Chinese civilization to the ancient Korea, such
as printing, food, medicine, philosophical thoughts, which not only boosted economic and political
development in Korea, but also laid the foundation of Korean’s modernity. In contemporary times,
China and South Korea are closely connected with each other through political partnership, trade,
and cultural exchange. Therefore, for China, where policies are always made by the elite class,
netizens’ opinions and their impact on China’s foreign policy towards South Korea—and even
future regional cooperation—is sometimes difficult to assess. It seems that the complexity of
Korea’s peninsula security pattern and the Sino-U.S. relationship are the main factors in changing
China-Korea relations rather than cultural confrontation. However, the Chinese spokeswoman of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to the intense debate between Chinese and Korean
netizens over the origin of Kimchi on January 20, 2021, which signaled that the Chinese
government was interested in what netizens said about South Korea on social media. More
importantly, the Chinese government has started to regard social media as a vehicle that reflects
people’s wishes and demands and seems to think that responding to views expressed on social
media is an effective way to maintain a close relationship between the CPC and people.
Because Chinese citizens feel suppressed or fearful of expressing their opinions in public,
social media has become a platform where they feel safer and freer to express themselves. For
China, with its strict online censorship, netizens are more likely to discuss cultural and social issues
rather than even more sensitive political and economic issues. Moreover, the popularity of social
media makes it the new battlefield for countries to shape their national image and show national
power. While Koreans are less afraid of criticizing the government, social media is an easy,
accessible communication system. Concerning the future bilateral relations between China and
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South Korea, intense online spats caused by cultural confrontation will only increase, which will
put more pressure on Chinese policymakers. Moreover, the popular narratives in social media may
be used as a leverage to gain an upper hand, seize initiative in the negotiations, and reap greater
benefits. These are why the popular narratives are becoming critical factors in international
competition and can’t be ignored even by an authoritarian regime.
This project examines popular discourse on social media about the cultural confrontation
between China and South Korea through content and statistical analysis of YouTube comments
and Weibo posts. This complex cultural relationship is analyzed through various conceptual frames.
First, I examine how the countries ridicule each other and label their people as “culture thieves”;
second, this study looks at each country’s critique of the other’s ideologies—with China accusing
Korea of acting as a watchdog for western countries and Korea criticizing China for violation of
human rights and democracy because of its communist and authoritarian rule; third, this project
explores the policy recommendations Chinese netizens gave to the Chinese government to stop
Korea’s cultural appropriation and gain more advantages in Chinese-Korean relations; finally, this
study reflects upon the positive voices in this hostile confrontation. With these multi-layered
dynamics and ongoing issues, China-South Korea relations may become even more complicated
for the foreseeable future.

Chinese-Korean Social Media Relations: Causes of the Confrontation and Emerging Social
Media
Previous research tends to focus on the ways in which China and South Korea are linked
together in mutually beneficial ways. Scott Synder asserts that “despite political and diplomatic
tensions, the fundamental complementary nature of the Chinese and South Korean economies
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continues to create mutual beneficial opportunities.” 2 It is of necessity for them to cooperate with
one another because of their common interests.3 Xiaoxiong Yi points out that “China and South
Korea have mutual economic and strategic interests, the potential for the cooperation is immense.
China is adjusting his Korean policy depending on everchanging peninsula security pattern to
ensure its strategic interests.”4
However, as this confrontation develops, there is increased scholarship that centers on the
conflict between China and South Korea. This conflict often focuses on cultural appropriation and
socioeconomic impact. Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun (2021) points out that “fueled by social
media, Beijing and Seoul’s history controversy uncovered a much wider clash of identities at the
societal level.”5 Chinese and Korean’ contradicting thoughts about culture and history has incited
the outrages of netizens in two countries. They were inclined to attribute those disputes to “culture
takeover” or “economic coercion.”6 In another study, Guozhong Li, Eun-Mi Park and Seong-Taek
Park (2015) conclude that social media is important in the “forming of country image which is the
source of competitiveness.”7 Using data analysis of PLS (Partial Least Square), they learned that
numbers of social media users in China and image of Korea are positively correlated. Using social

2

Scott Synder, “Clash, Crash and Cash: Core Realities in the Sino-Korean Relationship,” Comparative
Connections 4, no.2, (July 2002): 5.
3

Synder, 5-6.

Xiaoxiong, Yi, “Ten Years of China-South Korea Relations and Beijing's View on Korean Reunification,”
The Journal of East Asia Affairs 16, no.2 (Fall/Winter 2002): 351.
4

Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun, “Strategic Dilemmas, Clashing Identities, and Free Trade,”
Comparative Connections 22, no.3 (Jan 2021): 110-111.
5
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Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun, 110-111.

Guozhong Li, Eun-Mi Park and Seong-Taek Park, “Effects of social media usage on country image and
purchase intention from social P2P network perspective,” Peer-to-Peer Networking & Applications 9, no. 3 (May
2016): 488.
7
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media, the “general image of a specific nation positively influences purchasing products of the
nation.”8
According to the Fewsmith and Rosen, “The place of public opinion in China’s foreign
policy is a common yet controversial research topic.” 9 China’s foreign policy, thought to be
immune to online public opinion, is increasingly influenced by it. Thomas Olsen-Boyd (2019)
argues that “social media sentiment is forcing the hand of the Chinese government in a way that
may not necessarily be in line with government policy.”10 With the widespread use of social media
in China, the Chinese government has to react to public opinion online. After the “century of
humiliation,” Chinese people are sensitive about any attempt to humiliate China; moreover, the
Chinese government “will tolerate venting frustration towards foreign entities that cannot normally
be publicly articulated towards their own government.” 11 In terms of China-Korea relations,
cultural clashes attract more attention from the masses and people are more likely to comment on
these relevant issues, because compared to political and economic issues, culture is perceived as
more interesting, less political sensitive, and closer to our lives.
To date, there has been some analysis of the impact of social media on these bilateral
relations and China’s foreign policy toward South Korea. These studies, however, tend to hone in
on specific aspects of the conflict rather than giving a holistic analysis. Some authors assert that
“public opinion and netizens’ opinions forced the Chinese government to respond and was even

8

Guozhong Li, Eun-Mi Park and Seong-Taek Park, 494.

9

Andrew Scobell, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Astrid Cevallos, Arthur Chan, and Zev Winkelman,
“Netizen Opinion and China's Foreign Policy: Interpreting Narratives about North Korea on Chinese Social Media,”
Asia Policy 14, no. 3 (July 2019): 99.
10
Thomas Olsen-Boyd, “Stockholm Syndrome: social media can shape China’s foreign policy,” Lowy
Institute, March 28, 2019, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/stockholm-syndrome-social-media-canshape-china-s-foreign-policy.
11

See note 10 above.
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used to gain more benefits from the North Korea.”12 Public opinion plays an increasingly important
role in shaping the policies of China toward Japan 13 and the Unites States,14 and is even leveraged
by the Chinese government as a bargaining chip to accrue more benefits. A more in-depth analysis
will be helpful to look at how social media magnifies cultural conflicts. My research delves further
into these recent highly contested cultural disputes and examine how social media integrates into
social frameworks and impacts foreign policy. On social media, netizens have a platform to voice
opinions, which has major implications in terms of politics, economics and culture. As the Chinese
government attaches more importance to public opinion on social media, netizens’ narratives will
become an effective tool to achieve political goals.

Using Social Media Posts and Comments to Analyze Popular Narratives
With the development of digital technology and globalization, social networks have
integrated into the daily lives of those in China and South Korea. According to the most updated
data, “South Korea’s social media penetration rate has reached 87 percent, the third highest among
nations around the globe.” 15 There were 45.79 million social media users in South Korea in
January 2021, “equivalent to 89.3% of the total population in January 2021.” 16 In democratic
Korea, Korean people feel free to voice their opinions and comments on policies and regulations

12

Andrew Scobell, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Astrid Cevallos, Arthur Chan, and Zev Winkelman, 99.

James Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China’s Japan Policy (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2011).
13

14

Daniela Stockmann, Media Commercialization and Authoritarian Rule in China (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2012).
15
Woo-hyun, Shim, “Korea’s social media penetration rate ranks third in world,” The Korea Herald, Sep.
7, 2020, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20200907000815.

Simon Kemp, “Digital 2021: South Korea,” Datareportal, last modified Feb.11, 2021,
https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2021-southkorea#:~:text=There%20were%2045.79%20million%20social,total%20population%20in%20January%202021.
16
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through which they can participate in the realms of politics and social issues. Korean government
regards social media and netizens’ opinions as an important channel to discern public attitudes.
With the increased popularity of Weibo and WeChat, social media is becoming an essential
way for the Chinese government to supervise and monitor popular discourse with a focus on public
attitudes toward policies and regulations. By December 2020, about 989 million people had access
to the internet in China,17 and 175 million of them were under 18 years old.18 Over 680 million of
these netizens were adults with at least a high school degree and from an urban area.19 Sina Weibo
(“Weibo” hereafter), controlled by Alibaba Group, is widely used by Chinese netizens as a social
media platform for current news, entertainment, and public expression. Although there is strict
censorship of online expression, social media and online platforms still offer a relatively authentic
and candid means for Chinese popular discourse. The platforms also depict a realistic picture of
the national image of these countries and the effectiveness of cultural policies.
Compared with previous studies that selected specific posts to support their arguments, my
analysis reviews a wide range of data from social media platforms to create a more holistic picture.
In order to reflect the authentic popular discourse, I collected as much data as I could regardless
of sentiment or theme.

Data Collection

“The 47th Statistical Report on Internet Development in China,” China Internet Network Information
Center, February 2021, https://www.cnnic.net.cn/hlwfzyj/hlwxzbg/hlwtjbg/202102/P020210203334633480104.pdf.
17

18
“The Statistical Report on Internet Juvenile Users in China 2019,” Division of Juvenile rights protection
of Central Committee of the Communist Youth League and China Internet Network Information Center, May 2020,
https://www.cnnic.net.cn/hlwfzyj/hlwxzbg/qsnbg/202005/P020200513370410784435.pdf.
19

China.”

China Internet Network Information Center, “The 47th Statistical Report on Internet Development in
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My goal in collecting this data is to gain a deeper understanding of the popular discourses
in both China and South Korea surrounding Kimchi’s origin, the most discussed online cultural
confrontation. I have collected 103 posts made on Weibo from December 1st, 2020 to March 31st,
2021 and selected 977 comments from the video “the last episode of the ‘Life Series’: The life of
White Radish” published by Li Ziqi on Jan. 9th, 2021. Each post or comment contains one term, or
several terms related to Kimchi’s origin, China’s cultural appropriation, cultural theft, and
ideological attacks on each other. Table 1 and Table 2 show 977 useful comments from 977
accounts that I selected from 336,000 YouTube comments to ensure a diversity of comments and
avoid too much overlap and repetition. Table 3 shows the 103 posts from Weibo.

Content Analysis
I analyzed and coded every post or comment by relevance and topic. First, I coded a post
as relevant if it discussed cultural appropriation, ideology, and policy recommendations related to
China and South Korea. Second, I coded and categorized relevant posts according to a variety of
themes, as follows:
1) Kimchi is a Chinese food or Korean food;
2) critique of Chinese ideology;
3) Korean cultural independence;
4) Xinjiang and Hongkong and other sensitive issues in China;
5) sarcastic comments or posts;
6) ridicule of Korean’s scarcity of resources; and
7) ridicule of Koreans’ lack of knowledge of history and policy recommendations.
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Results
In my total of 1080 samples, 2.4% (26 samples) were coded as positive, while 97.6% (1054
samples) were coded as unfavorable. All of the samples from the YouTube comments were
negative, accounting for 90.46% of 1080 samples. Samples from Weibo, which reflected the public
attitudes of Chinese netizens, show different popular discourses from YouTube comments: 70.64%
were coded as unfavorable, while 29.36% were positive. Ruling out the influence of other factors,
including fifty-cent party, online army, 20 third-party’s intervention, 21 some netizens from both
China and Korea highlighted the importance of China-Korea friendship. This finding is an
essential foundation to repair and reconcile the bilateral relationship damaged by frequent online
confrontations and negative popular narratives.
The “Kimchi War” is a cultural confrontation based on each country’s own form of
nationalism, need for cultural independence and strategic considerations. Although some
comments on social media are too irrational to reference, they still offer essential glimpses into
China-Korea relations, which are not as good as what Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi claimed
when stating the countries are “friends who look after each other in times of trouble.” 22 Netizen
narratives reveal a tension between public opinion and the government’s official stance. Although
these discourses might have little influence on China’s foreign policy towards South Korea,
China’s official response and commentaries on government “mouthpieces” reveal that it is still of
relevance to the CPC leaders. As public opinion shapes the policy of democratic Korea, China will

20

Fifty-cent party and online army are groups supported by the Chinese government. The groups are
responsible for supervising the popular narratives and posting favorable words regarding the government.
21
Among the comments on the Li Ziqi’s YouTube video, there are lots of comments written in traditional
Chinese, which criticize the Chinese government and foment the dissent of both Chinese and Korean netizens.

During a tour of Northeast Asia in 2020, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi used the phrase “shou wang
xiang zhu” to describe the China-Korea relations, means China and South Korea should be “friends who look after
each other in times of trouble.”
22
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probably face pressure from Korea as they feel mounting pressure from the ever-intense online
conflict. Therefore, with nearly 1 billion net users today in China, the CPC will have to respond
and adjust their policies rather than ignored what citizens say as they have sometimes done in the
past.

Interpretation of Major Discourse on South Korea and China
Based on the data I collected, the major discourses of Chinese netizens on South Korea
related to the online confrontation over Kimchi consisted of three narratives: accusations towards
South Korea of “cultural thief”; critiques of South Korea’s betrayal of Chinese-Korean friendship
and its fawning over the western countries; policy recommendations on how to deal with ChinaKorea relations, including economic sanctions, military coercion, hard-core foreign policy. On the
Korean side, the popular narratives of Korean netizens focus on China’s cultural appropriation;
critique of China’s ideology and sensitive issues; and the importance of keeping a good
relationship with China. While comments sometimes overlap into more than one category, I chose
to code the comment based on the content that is most emphasized.
Table 1 Coded Chinese Netizens’ YouTube Comments on South Korea
Theme

Comments

% of Total

Korea: Country as a thief

143

39.39

“Kimchi is Chinese”

29

7.99

Ridicule of South Korea

191

52.62

TOTAL

363

100
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Table 2 Coded Korean Netizens’ YouTube Comments on China
Theme

Comments

% of Total

China: Cultural Appropriation

54

8.79

“Kimchi is Korean”

147

23.94

Critique of China’s ideology

109

17.75

China’s sensitive issues: Xinjiang, Tiananmen, COVID-19,etc

108

17.59

Mocking China

196

31.92

TOTAL

614

100

Table 3 Coded Weibo Posts on Origin of Kimchi and South Korea
Theme

Comments

% of Total

48

46.60

“Country as a thief”

24

23.30

Korean’s not confident in its own culture

8

7.77

lack of knowledge of history

16

15.53

19

18.45

Chinese should protect Chinese culture

14

13.59

China-Korea cooperation

4

3.88

Enhance the strength

1

0.97

29

28.16

Accusations: Cultural Thief

Policy recommendation

Mocking and Satire (hate Korean, watchdog of US,
narrow-minded, sanctions)

14
Kimchi is Korean food

3

2.91

Korean should be rational and respect history

2

1.94

“not a big deal, just a misunderstanding of Paocai

2

1.94

103

100

and Kimchi”
Total

Cultural Thieves: Accusations Towards One Other
In many posts, netizens accuse each other of cultural appropriation. Chinese netizens gives
South Korea the “nickname” of a “country of thieves,” mocking them for appropriating Chinese
culture, including traditional costumes, food, and books. Compared with the general negative
attitude of South Koreans, Chinese netizens are more inclined to use intense even insulting words:
among the terms frequently used in YouTube comments and Weibo posts are “country of thief”
(tou guo), “country of coldness” (han guo), “country of hell and coldness” (dahan minguo),
“watchdog of the West” (xifang de zougou), as well as “small country” (danwan zhidi), “former
colony of Japan” (riben de zhimindi).
Many posts by some famous Weibo accounts mock the idea that Korea is not a truly
independent country throughout history. It used to be the vassal state of China, the colony of Japan
and one of the military bases of the U.S. at present. As a result, they had to appropriate other
countries’ cultures and pretended itself as a country with a diverse culture. One post cites kimchi
as the side dish in China:
The thing in different cultures means differently. For example, in Northeast China, kimchi
can’t be served on the table when people invite friends for dinner because it is a side dish
or appetizer; in South Korea, it is a national food. It means nothing to China, but it means
significantly to South Korea. “A country, if without politeness and insult his important
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neighbor, will die in the end.” South Korea should learn Chinese because the first
constitution of South Korea was written in Chinese. 23
This post was reposted and commented over several thousand times. On one hand, it shows that
Chinese people are very proud of the diversity of Chinese culture; on the other hand, Chinese
netizens infer that Korean netizens are ridiculous to argue with them because Korean culture
borrows a lot from Chinese culture. Without Chinese culture, there is no Korean culture, not to
mention Kimchi.
Some netizens speculate as to why Koreans would like to “steal” Chinese culture and
conclude that Korea is not confident in its own culture and would not like to admit the significant
influence of China on Korean society. That a Chinese making Kimchi raises such an intense spat
makes many Chinese confused: they don’t think it is a big deal and can’t understand why Koreans
are so sensitive. One post comments that the “export of Chinese culture in Tang Dynasty and Ming
Dynasty have a great influence on the development of Korea but the success of the economy makes
Korea start to get rid of the trace of Chinese culture.”24 Another post states that Korea has been
trying de-Chinesization since Chosen Dynasty by inventing Hangul, manifesting the notion that
since the Chosen Dynasty, Korean people have struggled to get rid of Chinese influence and built
up a unique Korean identity. However, denying the cultural connection between two countries
only causes animosity. A Chinese netizen posted this comment:
What a joke! Do Korean have a culture? We Chinese made Paocai (Kimchi) thousands of
years ago. Cabbage, the raw material of Kimchi, is originated from China, not to mention

Xia, Zhu (@Zhuxia-CityChannel), “I am a tough lady from Northeast China, Kimchi is a side dish to
me,” Weibo, Jan. 13, 2021,
https://weibo.com/lrtvzx?refer_flag=1005055013_&ssl_rnd=1616185749.5196&is_all=1.
23

24
Yangzheng Gongkaike (@Yangzheng Gongkaike), “Korea’s inferiority complex and confuse about
history: Why Korean steal Kimchi?” Weibo, Jan.16, 2021,
https://s.weibo.com/weibo?q=%E9%9F%A9%E5%BC%8F%E8%87%AA%E5%8D%91%EF%BC%8C%E5%8E%
86%E5%8F%B2%E8%BF%B7%E5%A4%B1&wvr=6&b=1&Refer=SWeibo_box.
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Kimchi. It is ridiculous for Korean to claim Kimchi as their own cultural product. Do
Korean know history?25
Some Chinese netizens, like this one, relate Korean cultural appropriation with their lack
of knowledge of history. They list lots of historical facts, including how Chinese people had written
down how to make Kimchi in the Analects and thus mocking Korean peoples’ ignorance; and that
the raw material of Kimchi, cabbage, was also imported from China since Ming Dynasty. One post
states: “Korean netizens are a group of people who are ignorant, narrow-minded, and
stubborn . . .The Analects had recorded the method of making Kimchi in Shang Dynasty (16001046 B.C.) . . . Korean netizens should’ve gone to school and learned history.” 26
Most Korean netizens firmly claim that “Kimchi is Korean” and ridicule China as a
“cultural thief” regarding Kimchi as Chinese food. They accuse the Chinese of cultural
appropriation by “stealing” Kimchi, Hanbok, and traditional festivals. Like Chinese netizens’
aggressive responses, most Korean netizens use intense words to express their anger. Among the
words that they use frequently in the comments and posts are “Kimchi is Korean,” “apologize,”
“thief,” “Korean culture.” Some of them show anger about the name of this video27 “Chinese food”
and list several reasons “why kimchi is Korean food other than Chinese”: first, in Korea, there is
a refrigerator designed for storing Kimchi, called “Kimchi refrigerator”; second, there are several

25
Haishishenlou Jieshuo (@Haishishenlou Jieshuo), “Liziqi was strongly criticized by korean netizens for
making Kimchi,” Weibo, Feb. 14,
https://s.weibo.com/weibo/%25E9%259F%25A9%25E5%259B%25BD%25E4%25BA%25BA%25E6%259C%258
9%25E8%2587%25AA%25E5%25B7%25B1%25E7%259A%2584%25E6%2596%2587%25E5%258C%2596%25
E5%2590%2597?topnav=1&wvr=6&b=1.

Xiaochu fuji de meishaonv (@Xiaochu fuji de meishaonv), “Liziqi was criticized by Korean netizens for
making Kimchi,” Weibo, Jan.11, 2021,
https://s.weibo.com/weibo/%25E4%25B8%2580%25E7%25BE%25A4%25E6%2597%25A0%25E7%259F%25A5
%25E7%259A%2584%25E9%259F%25A9%25E5%259B%25BD%25E7%25BD%2591%25E5%258F%258B?top
nav=1&wvr=6&b=1.
26

“The last episode of the ‘Life Series’: The life of white radish” published by Li Ziqi on YouTube, Jan.
9 , 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B6bJ_vTslyo.
27

th
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hundreds of kinds of Kimchi, made from cabbage, radish, cucumber, pepper, sweet potato, and
eggplant; third, Kimchi is the symbol of Korea and Korean culture and is recognized by the global
society. Unlike Chinese netizens, Korean netizens rarely discussed or debated the historical origin
of Kimchi and the history of the bilateral relationship between China and Korea. Their avoidance
of this topic was attacked by the Chinese, who said Koreans lacked intelligence and selfconfidence.

Ideology: Watchdog and Authoritarian Regime
Another major theme that frequently occurs in YouTube comments and Weibo is the
critique of each other’s ideologies. China netizens criticize Korea of acting as a watchdog for
western countries and betraying the friendship which has lasted for hundreds of years. Korean
netizens criticize China for its human rights issues, authoritarianism, and communism. According
to them, China’s cultural appropriation speaks to the weaknesses of communism and authoritarian
regimes, such as no democratic system and freedom of speech. In addition, some Korean netizens
assert that cultural aggression towards neighbors is an important way for China to extend its
influence in the Asia Pacific region. In the meantime, Chinese netizens mock and ridicule Korea’s
“amnesia”: to become a “loyal friend” of western countries, especially the United States and Japan
after the Korean War (1950-1953), it turns a blind eye to the history of “Comfort Women” in the
2nd World War and the U.S. army base in Camp Humphreys.
In the samples I coded, Korean netizens attack China’s authoritarian regime. One post, for
instance, notes sarcastically that “China is a country full of lies, pride, supervision over people,
unsanitary places and counterfeit products.”28 Many users point out that the Chinese government

28

23, 2021.

Xi Jin Pooh, comment on Li Ziqi, “The last episode of the “Life Series”: The life of white radish!” Mar.
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poses strict censorship and supervision on social media and people’s comments, making it lose
people’s support gradually. They even assert that Li Ziqi is sponsored by the government and acts
as a tool to extend the Chinese cultural influence on the whole world. Moreover, many Korean net
users claim China used this video 29 to agitate the confrontation between Chinese and Korean
people to achieve its political goals. One post declares that “Four years ago, China boycotted
kimchi to protest against South Korea's THAAD deployment. Kimchi cannot be written in Chinese
letters. ISO also said that paocai is not kimchi. The Chinese don't know about government’s
brainwashing education.”30
Korean netizens also express dissatisfaction with how the CPC regime deals with Xinjiang
Muslims, Hong Kong, the spread of COVID-19 and other sensitive political and human rights
issues. They criticize the way the CPC treated the patriotic students in the democratic movement
in Tiananmen Square 1989 and Muslims in Xinjiang, condemning them for taking away Hong
Kong’s democracy, and denouncing China’s for not taking responsibility for the COVID-19
worldwide breakout. Such posts include “Kimchi is from Korea, COVID is from China.” 31
Another one states: “I’m really sorry for the Uighurs who are dominated by the Chinese
government.”32
Some Chinese net users criticize Korea’s loyalty to western countries as a sign that they
are a watchdog for the United States and claim that Korea exchanged independence for the

“The last episode of the ‘Life Series’: The life of white radish” published by Li Ziqi on YouTube, Jan.
9 , 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B6bJ_vTslyo.
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protection of the United States by allowing the existence of a US army base and intervention from
the US on domestic affairs. One post state, “Korea was the vassal state of China in the past, is the
colony of the US at present.”33 Another post claims, “US soldiers committed crimes on South
Korea territory, but Korean government has no right to punish them. South Korea is the slave of
US.”34 Moreover, some users argue that Korea criticized China for cultural stealing for making up
to the US’s complaint about China’s IP theft. One user writes that “the US said China stole their
technology, so Korean said China stole their Kimchi. It is ridiculous.” 35 Most Chinese netizens
seem to believe that Korea and western countries work closely to oppose and defame China and
thus feel disappointed about South Korea. Moreover, the deployment of THAAD and South KoreaUS joint military practices make the Chinese government and Chinese people feel betrayed. Angry
Chinese people attack Korea for putting China and Chinese people under the watch of the United
States and mock them for having no dignity: in order to be a loyal ally of the U.S., they said, Korea
has sacrificed its own security and independence.

Policy Recommendation: Sanctions, Cooperation and Friendship
While a great deal of this online debate has fueled and intensified this cultural confrontation,
more and more Chinese netizens have started to offer their advice, which has rarely been seen in
the past.36 Most of these policy recommendations are about taking hard-core foreign stances and
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33
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implementing economic sanctions. Despite the general anti-Korean sentiment, there are still some
Chinese netizens who claim that China-Korea relations are so important that the Chinese
government needs to deal with things carefully.
When netizens bring up policies or speak of bilateral relations, it is sad to see that many of
them view each other with distaste. Some Weibo posts observe that the military cooperation
between South Korea and the US has damaged China’s interests, and that they are taking advantage
of China in terms of trade and national security. Korean netizens point out that China is helping
Kim Jong Un and North Korea. Moreover, this frequent cultural confrontation has made the
bilateral relations more tenuous and fraught than ever before. Angry Chinese netizens call for harsh
measures to make Korean learn a lesson. One post states: “China should impose economic
sanctions on South Korea and stop importing Korean products . . . To be sure, Korean’s stealing
Chinese culture is a big deal, which should be paid attention to. China should give it a heavy blow
and make them learn from it.”37 Another post states, “I am a patriot. With regard to China-Korean
relations, I suggest that China needs to keep status quo and don’t lift the ban on Korean culture
products export.”38 A majority of Chinese netizens insist that economic sanction are a simple but
effective method to stop Korean’s cultural appropriation.
Along with those negative posts, there are some positive and rational voices. Some Chinese
netizens underscore that China should take responsibility for protecting Chinese culture. They call
for the promotion of Chinese culture through international platforms and social media, application
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of “Intangible Culture Heritage” for Chinese traditional festivals, foods, costumes, and other
cultural products, and increased culture exchange between China and other countries. Through
these means, there is no chance for Korea to appropriate Chinese culture. Other Chinese netizens
declared that cooperation is vital for China-Korea development. A netizen reasons that “China and
South Korea should learn from each other. We have similar food and traditions which are linking
us together. I hope we are friends forever.” 39 Besides, some Chinese netizens hoped that Chinese
and Korean should respect history. One post states that “it is right for Korean to protect its own
traditional culture, but it is also important to respect the history.”40
Moreover, some Chinese netizens declare the Kimchi War is a misunderstanding and
Chinese and Korean people should not take it seriously. The endless confrontation will only hurt
feelings of both Chinese and Koreans. A few Chinese netizens defend Korean netizens: “Kimchi
is Korean food and its unique food culture.”41 “Kimchi is Korean, Sushi is Japanese, Dumpling is
Chinese. This is irrefutable.”42 “I think Kimchi is Korean food. Paocai in China is salty, but Kimchi
is spicy.”43 These kind words may not stop the debate but will warm the hearts of Korean people.
Hopefully, more positive voices from both sides will join in.

Popular Narratives and China-Korea Relations
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When looking at these various popular narratives, we see various dimensions, tones, and
purposes to the comments. This is not surprising because the relationship between China and South
Korea is complex due to the historical parallels and geographical proximity. With shared ethnicity
and similar food and lifestyle, Chinese and Korean people have shared emotional bonds during
thousands of years of trade and exchange. As the cultural center of the Asia Pacific region, China
has a great influence on its neighbors in terms of politics, economy, culture, and lifestyle. The
Korean political system and Korean culture were developed from the imperial examination system,
Confucianism, Chinese characters, printing, food, and costumes. Chinese have gotten used to their
sense of cultural superiority for hundreds of years, while Koreans have been trying to get rid of
the label of “vassal state of Chinese culture.” Therefore, it is not difficult to understand the popular
narratives in the “Kimchi War”: both sides’ negative attitudes towards the other shows that the
battle to gain superiority is present in many aspects. At the same time, some positive perspectives
offer hope for reconciliation.
By analyzing several thousands of YouTube comments and Weibo posts, the popular
narratives on the Kimchi War can be divided into two main groups: on one hand, the majority of
Chinese and Korean netizens ridicule each other’s countries for cultural appropriation and
ideology; on the other hand, a small number of Chinese netizens show their understanding of this
cultural spat and their best hopes for long-lasting China-Korean relations.
It is too early to say that China-Korea relations will deteriorate due to these negative
popular narratives. However, these conflicting narratives can damage the national images of both
countries. In Weibo, a majority of Chinese netizens are calling South Korea “the country of Thief”
(Touguo), Korean people “people from country of thief.” The Chinese K-pop fans are called “fake
Koreans” (er’bangzi) or traitors. Although the Chinese government doesn’t change its stance, it
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has taken a series of measures on limiting the export of Korean products, which will accelerate the
spread of anti-Korean sentiment in China. Similarly, the anti-China sentiment in Korea has been
spreading. One post describes this phenomenon:
South Korean have very specialized anti-China and anti-Japan education system and media
industry . . . This is for specific political goals and this is why a lot of Korean always refuse
to admit a lot of history facts. There are always some Korean shout and claim “north China
belongs to Korean,” “Sushi& Kanji is from Korea.” . . . Now these people are come to Li
Ziqi.44
With the negative influence from popular narratives, very few Chinese and Korean netizens
call for maintaining friendly bilateral relations. This lack of policy advocacy may be due to
censorship and supervision and the suppression of positive opinions for political aims. 45 In
addition, with a large amount of “fifty-cent party” online, the Chinese government is probably
guiding popular narratives and creating an anti-Korean atmosphere. Chinese netizens might
believe that making policy recommendations online will get them in trouble and have little impact
on the official narratives. Therefore, they are not willing to voice their opinions, which they may
see as useless.
With direct mutual exchange decreasing, Chinese and Korean people’s impressions of each
other will largely be from news and social media. The hostile atmosphere on social media does
affect people’s perceptions in real life. Even worse, it creates prejudice or a negative first
impression, which is not conducive to the future positive development of China-Korea relations
and harmonious integration of the Asia Pacific region.
It is difficult to say that the negative popular narratives will impact the Chinese
government’s official stand because there are no obvious changes in foreign policies and official
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statements due to these cultural confrontations. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua
Chunying responded to the origin of Kimchi on Regular Press Conference on Jan. 20. She stated
that “We support meaningful and friendly exchange and discussion over academic issues
concerning paocai from a culinary perspective, but there should be no place for bias to avoid
inciting confrontation and affecting people-to-people ties.”46
However, some official accounts in Weibo owned or controlled by the Chinese government
have contained different comments. CGTN, the official account of Chinese Global Television
posted a video on January 12 with the title of “with regard to the Korean netizens’ criticism on Li
Ziqi and her video, who should keep a cool head?” The video claims that “While some South
Korean netizens consider kimchi to be a unique dish originated from their country, Chinese pickles,
in fact, have a long history that dates back to 1100 B.C. during the Zhou Dynasty.”47 Guanchazhe
Net, the official account of state-owned newspaper Guanchazhe.com, posted on January 11,
Korea, as the “country of Kimchi”, relied on the import of Kimchi from China and more
and more housewives gave up making kimchi at home because of the rising prices of
Kimchi. Some Korean media called it the humiliation of Korea, which may be the reason
of why Korean netizens are so sensitive about Li Ziqi’s video.48
The Sina Finance published a commentary that states “it is meaningless to debate over the origin
of Kimchi because that the Kimchi is originated from China is a hard fact.”49 Those comments
reflect that to some extent, the official stand is affected by the popular narratives. Those posts from
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state-owned media proved that in the era of social media, the Chinese government needs to pay
attention to the popular narratives to maintain social stability and make effective policy
adjustments.

Conclusion
With the influence of social media, the popular narratives affect policymaking and ChinaKorea relations to various degrees, but the pressure generated by posts and comments does not yet
seem to have significant implications on the Chinese government’s standpoint or actions when
dealing with China-Korea relations. Nevertheless, in many ways, the Chinese government attaches
much importance to these popular narratives, and their responses always have the CPC siding with
the Chinese people. In terms of China-Korea relations, the Chinese government may use the
popular narratives to show public anger about the Korean government, which makes it more likely
for them to gain advantages in bilateral negotiations.
By analyzing major discourse on social media, we see that most of the narratives focus on
cultural appropriation and only a small portion of them attack ideological differences, which
hopefully won’t cause substantial damage to the emotions and psyches of Chinese and Korean
people. If this is indeed the case, then China-Korea relations will not be greatly influenced by those
negative popular narratives. More importantly, China needs to keep good relations with South
Korea due to strategic considerations as well as economic and political partnerships. The influence
of Korean culture—in terms of food and culture—can’t be dismissed. In contemporary times, this
massive influence is demonstrated through K-pop, a genre with power that can’t be erased by
online conflicts or music-based regulations. Millions of Chinese people are obsessed with Kdramas, K-beauty, K-music, and Korean food. K-pop has been changing the Chinese lifestyle for
decades. Similarly, Korean society is deeply influenced by Chinese culture for thousands of years.
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At present, there are more and more cultural frictions hindering the potential for friendly mutual
exchanges, but I believe shared culture and common strategic interests will connect the Chinese
and Korean people closely once again.
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